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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents an unusual question pertaining to 
the liability of a surviving unincorporated local union after 
merger with it by another unincorporated local union for a 
debt of the latter. The district court held that pre-merger 
notice of the debt owed by the non-surviving local was not 
required and that the surviving local union was liable for 
the debt. The surviving local timely appealed. We affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The facts of this case are undisputed. Teamsters Local 
513 was a labor union which represented certain employees 
in the Philadelphia metropolitan area for purposes of 
collective bargaining. In September 1991, the members of 
Local 513 voted to merge into another local union, 
Teamsters Local Union No. 115. The merger became 
effective in early February 1992. Both of the local unions 
were unincorporated associations. On June 12, 1978, Silas 
Littlejohn began working for Local Union No. 513 as an 
office employee. He left this job in early February 1992. 
 
As an employee of Local 513, Littlejohn was covered by 
the Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Philadelphia & 
Vicinity (the "Pension Fund"), the Plaintiff/Appellee. All 
participating local unions were required to make 
contributions to the Pension Fund on behalf of their own 
employees. In spite of this obligation, Local 513 did not 
make any contributions to the Pension Fund on Littlejohn's 
behalf. On December 7, 1992, Littlejohn applied for and 
was denied a pension by the Pension Fund because it had 
not received any contributions in his behalf. Littlejohn 
appealed the Fund's decision. The Fund held a hearing, but 
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did not render a decision on the appeal. Having never 
received contributions on Littlejohn's behalf, the Pension 
Fund requested past contributions from Local 115. Local 
115 denied liability for Local 513's failure to pay the 
pension contributions. Local 115 took the position that it 
had never employed Littlejohn, had no knowledge of Local 
513's failure to make the pension contributions, and, 
therefore, Local 115 should not be liable for the 
contributions that Local 513 was required to make to the 
Pension Fund. 
 
Instead of rendering a decision on Littlejohn's appeal, in 
December 1995, the Pension Fund and the Fund's 
administrator, William Einhorn, filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania against Local 115 and Littlejohn. In its 
complaint, the Pension Fund sought a declaration either 
that Littlejohn did not participate in the pension plan and, 
thus, was not eligible for pension benefits, or that Local 115 
was responsible for delinquent contributions that should 
have been paid to the Pension Fund on Littlejohn's behalf 
by Local 513. The Pension Fund also requested, contingent 
on a finding that Local 115 was responsible for the 
delinquent contributions, a determination that Local 115 
was liable for interest, attorneys' fees, liquidated damages, 
and costs. 
 
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
The district court granted the Pension Fund's motion 
finding that Littlejohn was entitled to pension benefits and 
that Local 115 was required to pay the contributions to the 
Pension Fund that were improperly unpaid by Local 513. 
 
II. 
 
The Pension Fund is governed by the federal Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 
U.S.C. SS 1001-1461. ERISA covers the Fund because it is 
a private pension Fund established by both employers 
engaged in commerce and employee organizations 
representing employees engaged in commerce. See 29 
U.S.C. SS 1002(2)(A)(I), 1003(a)(3). Pursuant to ERISA, a 
claim like the one in this case--essentially to recover 
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employer contributions owed to an employee pension plan-- 
must be brought in a federal district court. See 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(e)(1); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 
(1987). Hence, the district court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the Fund's lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C. S 1331. In light of this 
independent basis for federal jurisdiction, the Pension 
Fund's invocation of the Declaratory Judgment Act, see 28 
U.S.C. S 2201, is proper. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950); Terra Nova Ins. 
Co., Ltd. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 857 F.2d 1213, 1217 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1989). 
 
This court has appellate jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291, because the district court entered final 
judgment against Local 115. We exercise plenary review of 
the district court's resolution of the parties' cross-motions 
for summary judgment. See Fornarotto v. American 
Waterworks Co., Inc., 144 F.3d 276, 278 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
III. 
 
Local 115 argues that it is not liable for the unpaid 
pension contributions because it did not have notice of the 
existence of the delinquency at the time that it merged with 
Local 513. Local 115 relies primarily on Golden State 
Bottling Co., Inc. v. National Labor Rel. Bd., 414 U.S. 68 
(1973), which stands for the proposition that a purchaser of 
a business, which continues the operations of that 
business with notice that the predecessor has committed an 
unfair labor practice, is liable for the damages caused by 
the unfair labor practice. See also Upholster's Union Pension 
Fund v. Artistic Furniture of Pontiac, 920 F.2d 1323, 1329 
(7th Cir. 1990). The Pension Fund counters that, under 
well-settled and long-standing principles of corporate 
liability, the surviving entity of a merger is liable for all of 
the debts of the predecessor entity regardless of whether 
the survivor had pre-merger notice of the debt. See John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 n.3 
(1964); 15 William M. Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of 
the Law of Private Corporations S 7121, at 226-27 (rev. ed. 
1990). 
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It is well established that ERISA displaces all state law 
purporting to relate to private pension plans. See McGurl v. 
Trucking Employees Welfare Fund, 124 F.3d 471, 476 (3d 
Cir. 1997). The statute, however, does not address many of 
the issues which arise in the normal course of the 
administration of such plans. Relevant to this case, it does 
not set forth principles governing successor liability. In a 
situation where the statute does not provide explicit 
instructions, it is well settled that Congress intended that 
the federal courts would fill in the gaps by developing, in 
light of reason, experience, and common sense, a federal 
common law of rights and obligations imposed by the 
statute. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 
(1996); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 
110-11 (1989); Franchise Tax Bd. Of California v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern 
California, 463 U.S. 10, 24 n.26 (1983). 
 
Of course, the federal common law must be developed 
with ERISA's policy goals in mind. One of the reasons 
Congress enacted ERISA was to protect plan participants 
and their beneficiaries. See 29 U.S.C.S 1001(b) (declaration 
of policies); see also Matinchek v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 
93 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996). In developing the federal 
common law, the federal courts have properly looked to 
state law for guidance. See McGurl, 124 F.3d at 481. 
Nonetheless, it is important that the federal courts, in 
formulating the common-law rules, do not strictly adhere to 
a single state's law at the expense of reason, experience, or 
common sense, or of furthering the policies of ERISA. Cf. 
Ream v. Frey, 107 F.3d 147, 154 (3d Cir. 1997) (while state 
trust law provides source of rules for ERISA, it is no more 
than a guide or starting point for developing common law 
rules for welfare plans). 
 
The parties spend much time arguing over the 
application of several cases which describe the development 
and construction of corporate successorship in the federal 
labor law context. Specifically, the United States Supreme 
Court has considered whether an employer's purchase of a 
business binds the purchaser to abide by a collective 
bargaining agreement between a union and the 
predecessor. See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 
 
                                5 
  
180, 185. In that case, the Court has held that successor 
liability is broader when the obligation involved is a 
collective bargaining agreement than it would be when an 
ordinary debt is involved. Id. at 182-83 n.5. In other cases, 
the Court has stated that an employer may be bound by 
the collective bargaining agreement of the predecessor as 
long as it had notice of the obligation and continued the 
operations of the predecessor even if the succeeding 
corporation purchased the assets of the old company and 
did not actually merge with it. Id. at 180-85; see also 
Howard Johnson Co., Inc. v. Detroit Local Jt. Exec. Bd., 417 
U.S. 249, 257 (1974); Livingston, 376 U.S. at 349-51 
(surviving company in merger bound to arbitrate grievance 
with union under terms of collective bargaining agreement 
signed by predecessor). Those cases are somewhat 
distinguishable because they dealt with the application of 
labor law concepts and the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement to a corporation other than the signatory to the 
agreement. Here, the parties agree that only the transfer of 
a valid and ordinary debt is at issue which just happens to 
have its genesis in the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement. The issue distinctly is not whether the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement signed by Local 513 will 
be enforced against Local 115. 
 
We agree with the district court and reject Local 115's 
argument that the surviving entity in a merger must have 
notice of a predecessor's debt in order to be liable for it. 
Reason, common sense, and experience--as well as the 
overwhelming weight of authority--persuade us that we 
should adopt the general rule that the surviving entity in a 
merger is liable for the constituents' debts even when the 
survivor does not have notice of the debt. 
 
Many courts, including this one, have stated that when 
an obligation imposed by federal labor or environmental law 
is involved, merger or consolidation automatically operates 
to transfer the debts of the predecessor to the surviving 
entity. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Beazer East, 
Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 565 (3d Cir. 1997); Southward v. South 
Central Ready Mix Supply Corp., 7 F.3d 487, 495 (6th Cir. 
1993) (dicta); Artistic Furniture, 920 F.2d at 1325; Anspec 
Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th 
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Cir. 1991). In addition, two district courts have considered 
a question quite similar to the one raised here. Both district 
courts held that the merger of two local unions, in most 
circumstances, makes the survivor liable for the 
constituents' debts. See EEOC v. Local 638, 700 F. Supp. 
739 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Local No. 1, Broadcast Employees v. 
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 461 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Pa. 
1978), aff 'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 614 
F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 
These cases confirm the almost universally accepted state 
law principle that when two corporations merge, the 
surviving corporation assumes the liabilities of the extinct 
corporation. See, e.g., 15 Pa. C.S.A. S 1929(b) (all debts of 
each corporation "shall be deemed to be transferred to and 
vested in the surviving or new corporation"); N.J.S.A. 
S 14A:10-6(e) ("the surviving or new corporation shall be 
liable for all the obligations and liabilities of each of the 
corporations so merged"); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, S 259(a) 
("all debts due to any of said constituent corporations ... 
shall be vested in the corporation surviving"); 15 Fletcher et 
al. SS 7117, 7121, at 216-18, 226-230 (collecting cases and 
statutes from numerous states). Local 115 does not 
contend that its merger agreement with Local 513 provided 
that it only assumed the debts of which it had notice. 
Generally, there is no requirement that the surviving entity 
have pre-merger notice of the predecessor's debts. Indeed, 
we have found no authority--either in the labor law context 
or any other for that matter--which stands for the 
proposition that a surviving corporation must have notice of 
the predecessor's debts in order to be liable for them. This 
is especially true when the merger agreement between the 
locals did not require notice. 
 
The parties do not contend that the local unions, because 
they are unincorporated associations and not corporations, 
should not be subject to this general rule. We agree. There 
is nothing in the record to suggest that the status of the 
local unions prevented Local 115 from having complete 
access to the records of Local 513 and, thus, from having 
an opportunity to ascertain the nature of Local 513's debts. 
As a practical matter, the affiliation of the two locals with 
the International brotherhood of Teamsters Union should 
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have facilitated the access of the locals to the payroll, 
audits and other records of assets and liabilities of each 
other. Further, we see no reason to believe that the 
employees of unincorporated associations are deserving of 
less protection than those of a corporation in this context. 
 
An examination of this general rule demonstrates not 
only its basis in reason but also that adopting it in this 
context will further ERISA's policy goal of protecting 
employee pension plan participants and their beneficiaries. 
See 29 U.S.C. S 1001(a). First, the two merging entities 
either do have, or can assure that they have, access to all 
the information necessary to determine the precise nature 
and number of liabilities of the predecessor entity. This is 
especially true in a case like this where the existence of the 
debt is so readily discoverable. In contrast, the participants 
and beneficiaries may have no reason to know that the 
contributions have not been made or that the surviving 
entity does not have notice of the debt. Thus, it is 
appropriate to put the burden of ascertaining the liabilities 
of merged entities on the surviving entity rather than on its 
employees. This will further ERISA's goal of protecting 
participants and beneficiaries in pension plans as the 
burden is on the employer to assure itself that it is not 
delinquent. Second, requiring notice to the surviving entity 
before a debt follows a merger would result in perverse 
incentives, encouraging the survivor to not examine records 
and hide its head in the sand for fear of receiving notice of 
an obligation. We are loathe to create such incentives. 
Third, requiring notice as a condition for payment would 
allow a disappearing constituent to unilaterally extinguish 
a debt--which it may have voluntarily assumed--simply by 
hiding it from the surviving entity before the merger. See 
Howard Johnson Co., 417 U.S. at 257. Introducing such 
uncertainty into this area could severely undermine 
ERISA's goals. 
 
Local 115 is in a particularly unsympathetic position in 
this case. There is no dispute that Local 115 actually 
merged with Local 513. The parties agree that this was not 
an asset sale or something short of full fusion of the two 
entities. Moreover, even if Local 115 did not realize that 
Local 513 had not funded Littlejohn's pension, this is not 
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such an unusual liability that it could not have foreseen its 
existence. In short, any reasonable entity would have been 
on notice to examine Local 513's records for this type of 
obligation, especially in light of Local 115's similar 
commitment to make contributions for its employees to the 
Pension Fund. There is no contention that Local 115 had 
anything less than full access to all of Local 513's payroll 
and pension records. Indeed, this was not a consolidation 
of two stranger corporations with little knowledge of each 
others' operations, but a merger of two sister locals, both of 
which operated in a similar manner and which were 
offspring of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 
 
IV. 
 
In sum, we hold that when two unincorporated local 
unions merge, the survivor assumes the liabilities of the 
extinct constituent even if it does not have pre-merger 
notice of the debt. For the foregoing reasons, the district 
court's January 10, 1997 judgment will be affirmed. Costs 
taxed against Teamsters Local Union 115. 
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